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ABSTRACT 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TURKEY  
by  
Ömür Candar 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Süheyla Özyıldırım 
             Department of Management 
July 2003 
This study estimates the impact of military expenditures on economic growth 
in Turkey over the period of 1950-2001 by employing a cointegration analysis 
developed by Engle and Granger (1987). The model integrates some of the 
commonly used variables in defence economics models into a simple growth 
specification and allows the influences of the defence spending on economic 
growth to be revealed empirically. The results indicate that military 
expenditures have a positive effect on economic growth both in the long and in 
the short run. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Military expenditures, economic growth, cointegration, Engle-
Granger. 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE’ DE ASKERİ HARCAMALAR VE EKONOMİK BÜYÜME  
 
Ömür Candar 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Süheyla Özyıldırım 
 İşletme Fakültesi 
Temmuz 2003  
Bu çalışma, Engle ve Granger tarafından geliştirilen ko-entegresyon analizini 
kullanarak, 1950-2001 yılları arasında Türkiye’ de askeri harcamaların 
ekonomik büyüme üzerine etkilerini araştırmaktadır. Model, diğer savunma 
modellerinde de sıkça kullanılan değişkenleri basit bir büyüme modelinde 
birleştirerek, savunma harcamalarının ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkilerini 
ampirik olarak incelemeye imkan tanımaktadır. Yapılan inceleme neticesinde, 
askeri harcamaların ekonomik büyüme üzerinde hem uzun dönemde, hem de 
kısa dönemde olumlu etkisinin olduğu görülmüştür. 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Askeri harcamalar, ekonomik büyüme, ko-entegresyon, 
Engle-Granger. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
The question of how defense spending effects economic growth has been an 
important concern to both academicians and politicians (Mintz and Stevenson 
1995). Especially after the end of the Cold War, this concern gained even 
greater importance that people in many countries have asked for reductions in 
defense spending. The importance of this subject is also exemplified by the 
UN Committee for Development Planning. The committee stated that “The 
single and most massive obstacle to development is the worldwide expenditure 
on national defence activity” (see Jolly 1978). It became significant, because 
of the vast consequences and implications that policy and allocation choices of 
the governments have for the countries’ national security and economic 
development (Heo 1998). However, despite the fact that military spending 
decreased significantly with the end of the Cold War, the pursuit of achieving 
security still leads governments to devote a significant portion of total 
government spending to defense expenditures.  
 
Starting with Benoit’s seminal study in 1973, many studies have been 
conducted to reexamine this relationship with different models and 
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methodologies. These studies and the following debates in this area have 
created a literature with different results; yet, there is no clear whether defense 
spending stimulates or hinders economic growth. However, in literature the 
models are classified as Supply-Side (Feder-Type) Models, Demand and 
Supply-Side (Deger-Type) Models, and Granger Causality Tests. The vast 
majority of the empirical studies are cross-country analyses, which, although 
useful for comparative analysis, cannot provide the important elements of the 
defence-growth relationship (Ward et al. 1991). It is very difficult to find 
countries in the same economic conditions. As Ram (1995) mentioned “...while 
some of the sample countries are in recession others may be expanding and 
growing” and according to Kusi (1994) “...the effects of military expenditures 
cannot be generalized across countries since these, among other things, may 
depend on the sample period and the level of the socio-economic development 
of the country concerned”.  As emphasised by Sezgin (1999c), cross-country 
studies give limited evidence for defence-growth relationship because of the 
following reasons: 
1. Countries differ depending on common structural characteristics 
(low/medium/high growth or low income/high income countries. Single-
country analysis avoids these kinds of problems and yields relatively 
reliable results. 
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2. It is important to find whether a change in defence expenditures causes a 
change in economic growth, and if so, how that change in defense 
expenditures causes a change in economic growth. For this cause-effect 
relationship, cross-country methodology gives little evidence.  
3. Choosing cross-country sample periods needs careful attention due to 
highly different economic conditions (recession, growth etc.). 
4. Since each country has its own currency, using exchange rates needs 
converting national currencies to a common currency. But exchange rates 
cannot reflect average price levels among countries. Because in LCDs 
usually exchange rates are fixed or overestimated. Therefore the rate is not 
altered quickly (Deger 1986). 
So, in order to have robust evidence for the defence-growth analysis, it would 
be profound to support cross-country studies with individual country/case 
studies (Ram 1995).  
Following Ram (1995), a number of academicians studied Turkey’s defense-
growth relationship in recent years. Sezgin (1997) analyzed this relationship 
using Feder-type model and found that defence spending has a positive effect 
on economic growth. This positive effect of defence spending is supported by 
Sezgin’s further studies (1999b, 2000). However, Özsoy (2000), using similar 
Feder-type model, could not find any significant effect of military spending on 
Turkey’s economic growth. Sezgin (1999a) and Dunne et al (2001) found a 
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negative relationship by using two Granger causality studies. In a recent study 
by Sezgin and Yıldırım (2002), it is found that military expenditure appears to 
enhance economic growth both in the short run and in the long run. Their 
findings, using a vector autoregressive model (VAR) over the period of 1949-
1994 supported the early evidences in Sezgin’s findings (1997, 1999b and 
2000). But, overall, the findings for Turkey have mixed results. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide further empirical evidence on the defense-
growth relationship for Turkey, a country with scant resources, serious 
economic problems and security concerns. Like most of the countries in the 
region, she continues to spend a high proportion of her GDP on defense each 
year (around 4% of GDP during the last decade in contrast to the average 
NATO’s burden of 2.5%). In this study, commonly used variables of the many 
competing defense models are combined into a simple growth specification to 
reveal the impact of defense expenditures on economic growth empirically. 
The framework for the model is based on the cointegration analysis of Engle-
Granger (1987) two-step procedure. Using the data over the period of 1950-
2001, empirical evidence was found that military spending had a positive 
effect on economic growth in the long run as well as in the short run.  
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The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 examines the reasons 
of Turkey’s high military expenditures. First, the strategic importance of 
Turkey in the region is emphasized. Then, the security concerns are explained. 
The Chapter 3 is a review of previous theoretical and empirical studies within 
the defence economics literature regarding the relationship between military 
expenditures and national economic growth. The Chapter 4 explains the 
estimation method. The sources of the data and the analysis results derived 
from the data over the period of 1950-2001 are presented in Chapter 5. The 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
MILITARY EXPENDITURES  
2.1 Military Expenditures of Turkey  
In today’s continuously changing international conditions, Turkey's national 
security objectives have not changed: to protect the freedom, independence 
and integrity of the country; to continue to preserve the principles and values 
established by the constitution; to enhance the welfare and security of the 
nation; to develop the economy in and out of the country; to acquire friendly 
relations and alliances with other countries and to create an environment of 
peace and stability around Turkey. Although ideological divisions and the 
global threat of the Cold War are over, Turkey’s national security is still 
threatened by potential ethno-political conflicts, terrorism and armed 
aggression (Çakar 1996). Therefore, Turkey must be cautious to potential risks 
and to continue to spend some amount of its GDP for these concerns (See 
Table 1).  
Table 1: Turkey’s Military Expenditures 
YEAR 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
TL 
trillion 3.789  7.158 13.88 23.65 42.3 77.7 157 303 612 1,183 2,289 4,168 6,248 9,030 
US 
$million 4,280 4,952 5,983 6,151 6,470 7,153 7,006 7,184 8,044 8,380 8,781 9,696 9,383 8,885 
%  of 
GDP 3 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.3 5 4.9 n.a. 
SOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook 2002 
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Since 1988, Turkey’s expenditures on defense and national security have been 
increasing.  When we compare the defense expenditures of Turkey with its 
neighbors and the other countries in the region, it is seen that they are quite 
modest; actually, it is generally below the region’s average (See Figure 1 and 
Table 2). According to SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Turkey has one of the lowest 
military expenditure per soldier in the region (around USD 11,000 per soldier). 
However, its expenditures as a share of GDP are still higher than NATO 
countries’ expenditures. But, when Turkey’s security concerns and strategic 
importance are taken into consideration, this amount can be justifiable.  
 
Figure 1: Military Expenditures in the Region
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Table 2: Regional and Global Comparisons 
(Figures are in US $m., at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates.) 
COUNTRY 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Turkey 4280 4952 5983 6151 6470 7153 7006 7184 8044 8380 8781 9696 9383 8885 
% of GDP 3 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.3 5 4.9 .. 
Greece 5004 4692 4744 4499 4675 4564 4642 4742 5025 5355 5836 6110 6449 6577 
% of GDP 5.1 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9 .. 
Syria 3232 3307 3065 4956 4592 3635 3923 3948 3669 3786 4104 4184 4526 4737 
% of GDP 7.9 8 6.9 10.4 9 7.2 7.4 7.1 5.9 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.5 .. 
Iran 3309 3123 3614 3771 3596 4516 6129 4537 5131 5745 6064 6148 9110 11515 
% of GDP 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.6 3 3.1 2.7 3.8 .. 
Bulgaria . . 1412 1502 820 618 467 401 395 323 310 330 377 378 361 
% of GDP . . 4.8 4.2 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.7 3 3 .. 
Israel 7902 7612 7956 7634 7808 7296 7346 7578 8159 8207 8539 8511 9012 9107 
% of GDP 13 12.4 12.2 11 10.5 9.4 8.8 8.3 8.6 8.4 8.4 8 8 .. 
Russia 437600 405800 343300 .. 80400 70900 68600 43400 39500 42200 30600 35900 40300 43900 
% of GDP 15.8 14.2 12.3 0 5.5 5.3 5.9 4.1 3.8 4.2 3.2 3.6 4 .. 
Reg.’s 
Average 8 7.2 6.6 5 5.4 5 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.9 .. 
NATO .. .. 503906 .. .. .. .. 472284  456879 457112 468960 474339 472682 
% of GDP 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 
..: Data not available or not applicable  
SOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook 2002 
 
Not only Turkey’s military expenditure has been increasing, but there is a 
trend that world military expenditure has been increasing since 1998, after an 
eleven-year period of reductions (1987-98) (See Appendix A). The SIPRI 
Yearbook 2002 presents an estimate for world military spending in 2001 of 
839 billion dollars in current prices (772 billion dollars in constant prices). The 
increase in military expenditure since 1998 is the result of rising disputes in 
most geographical regions. The only exceptions are Western Europe, where 
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the increase has been very small. The regions with the strongest growth in 
military expenditure are Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, South Asia and 
the Middle East (It can be said that Turkey lies among these regions). The 
reasons for the rising expenditures vary between the regions. For example, in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the increase is the result of the recent trend in 
Russian military spending. Russian military expenditure began to increase in 
1999 and has continued to increase since then. Moreover, in the Middle East, 
the increase can be interpreted as the result of several factors, including the 
Arab–Israeli conflict, the continuation of the armaments program in Iran and 
the new war between USA and Iraq. In 2001, there were also major increases 
in the Gulf States, coinciding with a rise in oil revenues.  
 
Total world military spending for 2001 of 839 billion dollars represents a 
significant proportion of world economic resources. As a global average it 
accounted for 2.6 % of world GDP and 137 dollars per capita. Nonetheless, 
both economic resources and military expenditure are unevenly spread. The 15 
major spenders account for over three-quarters of world military spending. 
Five countries account for over half. The United States accounts for 36 %, 
followed by Russia with 6 % and France, Japan and the UK with about 5 % 
each. The 63 countries in Africa and Latin America together accounted for 5 
% of world military spending in 2001. High-income countries also have the 
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highest per capita spending. In some of these countries, annual military 
expenditure exceeds 1000 dollars per capita. With military expenditures of 
USD 8.9 billion in 2001, Turkey is the fourteenth major spender in the world 
(See Appendix B). Turkey will continue to spend some amount of its GDP (4-
5%) in the future to cope with regional and global threats, to keep pace with 
NATO standards, and develop its domestic military-industrial base. 
 
2.2 Reasons of Military Expenditures 
There are different motives for different countries to increase their military 
spending. For example, Castillo et al. (2001) explains the reasons of increasing 
military spending with three hypotheses. According to them, the ambition 
hypothesis argues that countries experiencing rapid economic growth acquire 
greater international ambitions and thus increase their military spending (For 
example, North Korea). The fear hypothesis argues that countries increase 
their military expenditures when they face increased threat to their security 
(For example, Iraq). The legitimacy hypothesis argues that governments that 
believe their survival is threatened by domestic opposition use an aggressive 
foreign policy and higher levels of military spending to garner more support at 
home (For example, Greece).  
Despite the fact that these hypotheses might also be valid for Turkey, its 
position is unique and more complex than the other countries increasing their 
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military spending. The reasons behind Turkey’s increasing military 
expenditures should be reviewed thoroughly by taking its security concerns 
into consideration as well.  
 
    2.2.1 Security Concerns of Turkey 
Turkey is situated in a geo-strategic region, which includes the Balkans, 
Mediterranean, Middle East, Caucasus and extends to Central Asia and the 
Black Sea, including the Turkic Republics. This geography can be argued as 
one of the most unstable and uncertain areas of the world. Most of the conflicts 
that have high importance on the international arena today are happening 
around Turkey (Çakar 1996). It has borders with former Soviet Union 
(Georgia and Armenia), Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, and Bulgaria which Turkey 
has hostile relations of past. Turkey’s relations with its neighbors are not at all 
trouble-free. It has unresolved vital issues with Greece, Cyprus and Syria. It 
has ideological differences with Iran. It has opposite ideas with Armenia on 
the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and on historical accounts. Despite the 
attractive and promising prospects of partnership, Turkey and Russia, still 
need to overcome the legacies of the past. With its future unclear, Iraq, Iran 
and Syria provide sanctuaries for separatist terrorism.  
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Turkey and Greece are engaged in bilateral controversies over the Aegean Sea 
and Cyprus, despite the fact that both countries are NATO members. The 
Treaty of Lausanne has established today’s status quo in the Aegean. Since 
Kardak crisis with Greece in 1996, the Turkish military has given greater 
attention to Greece's potential as a military threat.  Greece's "Joint Defense 
Doctrine" with the government of Cyprus and attempts by the Government of 
Cyprus to acquire S-300 missiles in 1998 intensified the tensions always 
present in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey.  Overall, Greece is viewed 
more as a military irritant than a genuine threat. In relations with Greece, 
Turkey is resolved to oppose any situation that may damage its national 
interests and security. So long as the problems between the two countries 
remain unresolved, the arms race between the two countries continues and 
they spend large amount of money (See Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Military Expenditures of Turkey and Greece
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The Cyprus problem began after unilateral abrogation of the constitutional 
order by the Greek Cypriots in 1963. Turkey was forced to intervene in Cyprus 
in 1974. Turkey's intervention was undertaken in accordance with its rights 
and obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. The negotiations 
initiated under the UN Secretary-General envision a new solution to unify the 
island. But, there are growing signs of intention to use force in the Greek 
Cypriot’s aggressive military build up and the harassment of Greek ships and 
aircraft in the Aegean. There apparently exists a risk of military conflict in 
Cyprus. 
The post-Cold War ethnic grievances, each of which has a potential to burst 
regional conflicts, surround Turkey in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Different 
historical and cultural affiliations create different perceptions and attitudes. 
There again, Turkey has to resist and tackle the difficulties of being a sub-
regional country. Turkey is a Balkan country and has close historical, cultural, 
sociological and geographical ties with the Balkans. The Balkans is very 
important to Turkey, because of the relations with Europe. Turkey has 
legitimate interests in the arrangement that are being worked out in the area, 
and also has a benevolent, real and important influence in serving the interests 
of peace and stability in this part of the world (Ergüvenç 1998). Despite the 
attempts for peace, the conflicts in the region seem to continue for a long time.  
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The Azeri-Armenian dispute remains unresolved because of the Armenia’s 
continued occupation of 20% of Azeri territory and the severe conditions of 
more than one million displaced Azeris. Armenian withdrawal from the 
occupied Azeri lands and the return of refugees to their homes would facilitate 
good neighborly relations and cooperation between Turkey and Armenia. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the beginning of hostilities in the former 
Yugoslavia, Turkey has persistently asked the international community for the 
prevention of further violence and tragedies, which are the worst committed 
since World War II. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed 
dramatically with the effective and decisive intervention of NATO. Turkey has 
upgraded its military force in Bosnia to the brigade level. In addition, there are 
some Turkish naval and air assets that contribute to the international peace 
operations. Turkey is committed to participation in the training and equipping 
of the Bosnian army. 
The problems with Iraq are one of the most important issues in the region. 
Turkey cooperated with the international coalition during the Gulf War and 
remained committed to its obligations in spite of its huge economic loss from 
the war until the second war between U.S. and Iraq. This new war also 
increased the tension and military activities in the region, creating new 
potential threats to Turkey. Therefore, Turkey is committed to the sovereignty, 
unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, which are vital for peace and stability in 
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the area. The lack of authority and the consequent struggle for power between 
the local groups in Northern Iraq caused harm to Turkey through connected 
terrorist activities. The UN sanctions imposed on Iraq not only caused pain 
and difficulties to Iraqis, but also create great economic problems for Turkey 
that still need to be addressed. Also, U.S.’ threats of military intervention to 
Syria and Iran are other serious problems that make Turkey anxious.  
The conflicts between Palestinians and Israel also create instability in the 
region and put Turkey on alert.  
Last, but not the least is terrorism. Turkey has been struggling with terrorism 
directed against its indivisible territorial integrity for more than 15 years. More 
than 30,000 civilians and soldiers have been killed in the last 15 years in the 
battles with the terrorists.  Turkey's efforts against terrorist activities are 
considered as a national responsibility and takes place on a completely legal 
platform. The protection and safeguarding of the unitary nature of Turkey are 
essential and Turkey spends millions of dollars to take all necessary steps to 
combat and eradicate terrorism.  
 
In order to cope with the domestic and international security concerns and 
problems, Turkey has steady defense expenditures. From military point of 
view, a weak Turkey will not be able to contribute to peace and stability 
efforts in the region and in the world. 
  16 
C h a p t e r  3  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Studies in the World 
Although many studies have investigated the relationship between defense 
spending and economic performance, there is no strong conclusion about the 
defense-growth relationship. Neither political/economic theory nor empirical 
results of prior studies provide conclusive support for a peace dividend or a 
“guns vs. growth” tradeoff (Pane and Sahu 1993). Thus, in a review article, 
Chan (1995) concludes that “significant weak links between defense spending 
and economic growth   remain in our knowledge, so that there is much yet to 
learn about the defense-growth relationship”.   
 
Benoit’s seminal study (1973) on the defense-growth relationship was the 
starting point for much research in this area. His work involved a cross-section 
correlation analysis of 44 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) for the period 
1950-1965 and his finding that there is a positive correlation between military 
burden and economic growth was criticized by many scholars in terms of 
methodology, analysis and data used. In his study of 54 LCDs (21 African, 13 
Western Hemisphere, 11 Asian, and 9 Middle Eastern and Southern European) 
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over a period of 1965-1973, Lim (1983) concluded that Benoit’s conclusion 
can be questioned on two counts. First, the estimating equations used were not 
consistent with the hypothesis that was tested. Second, the measurement of 
some of the variables used left much to be desired. Lim (1983) showed that 
defense spending was detrimental to economic growth. There were, however, 
important regional differences. Another important criticism came from Ball’s 
(1983) descriptive study. He asserted that Benoit used an imperfect method to 
study defense-growth relationship. Frederikson and Looney extended Benoit’s 
work in 1983. They used the same sample of countries and the same time 
period, but the sample countries are divided into two groups as relatively poor 
countries and others. They found a negative effect for poor countries and 
positive for relatively rich countries and they showed that Benoit’s sample was 
inadequate. When Benoit’s sample and the time period are examined, it can be 
seen that Benoit’s estimates of correlation coefficient for defense spending and 
growth were fragile (Grobar and Porter 1983). Despite some of its weaknesses, 
Benoit’s work remains a starting point for defence-growth relationships. 
 
After Benoit’s study (1973) many studies were developed to reexamine 
defense-growth relationship using consistent formal models, based on 
theoretical frameworks, well-established methodologies and more reliable 
data. There is, however, still no consensus as to whether defense spending 
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promotes or hinders economic growth. It seems that the diversity in results is 
due to the sample of countries chosen - developed versus less developed and 
developing countries or cross-country analysis versus case-study analysis, the 
time-period chosen, the type of empirical analysis, the type of model and its 
theoretical underpinnings (Dunne 1996).  
 
3.1.1 Different Views on Defense-Growth Relationship 
In general, there are three different perspectives concerning the relationship 
between defense spending and economic growth. 
 
3.1.1.1 Defense Spending Has a Positive Effect 
A group of scholars (Benoit 1973, 1978, Kennedy 1983, Weede 1983, 
Atesoglu and Muller 1990, Biswas 1993) argues that defense spending 
stimulates economic growth. Because, military as an organized force helps in 
the process of modernization, contributes to technological progress, establishes 
specialized organizations that create new skills in short supply, fosters R&D, 
and creates demand for industries which may suffer from underemployment of 
capital. That is, defense spending enhances aggregate demand, increases 
purchasing power, and produces positive externalities. Defense spending 
generates contract awards, which generate jobs and increase purchasing power 
of workers.  The increased purchasing power will lead to more demand. 
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Through this process of increasing aggregate demand and employment, 
defense spending helps economic growth (De Grasse 1983).  
Defense spending is also invested to develop weapons technology, which often 
involves heavy industry. In the process of research and development, the 
civilian sector often receives the benefits of technology spillover. For example, 
a radar device developed under U.S. Navy contract and then rejected for 
military use is being adapted for use in hospitals to closely monitor heartbeats 
without being attached to the skin, making it particularly useful in therapy for 
burn victims (Gold 1990). In addition, defense spending generates a number of 
positive externalities, such as human capital formation, security spillover, and 
so on. According to Benoit (1978), the military not only subsidizes education 
but also provides a vocational and technical training, which may be used in 
private sector later. For example, Air Force pilots may fly civilian planes after 
retirement; technicians and health professionals trained in the military may 
provide these services in the private sector after discharge. Some people also 
get an education directly from military organizations or through subsidies for 
civilian education from military, which improve the quality of human 
resources. In addition, a safe environment is a necessary requirement for 
economic development. A strong military will not only provide a secure 
economic environment, but also it will provide a stronger position for the 
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national leadership in negotiating with other countries on economic, trade or 
security matters (Ram 1993). 
 
3.1.1.2 Defense Spending Has a Negative Effect 
Another group of scholars argue that defense spending has a negative impact 
on economic growth due to its opportunity cost (Deger and Smith 1983, Deger 
1986, Faini, Annez, and Taylor 1984, Mintz and Huang 1990, 1991, Ward and 
Davis 1992, Deger and Sen 1995). According to Deger and Smith (1983), 
military expenditures had a small positive effect on growth through 
modernization effects and larger negative effects through savings. Since the 
latter outweighed the former, the net effect on the growth rate was negative. 
One of the most common arguments in this category is that there is a tradeoff 
between defense spending and civilian resource use (the guns vs. butter 
tradeoff or the guns vs. investment tradeoff). The guns vs. butter tradeoff is 
that an increase in defense spending will reduce social welfare expenditures, 
such as public expenditures on health and/or education. The guns vs. 
investment tradeoff can be explained by two different types of tradeoffs 
(opportunity cost). The first type of tradeoff is a budget-included tradeoff 
(budgetary opportunity costs). In general, government expenditures must be 
financed through taxes on private income, budget deficits, or printing new 
money (DeGrasse 1983, Cappelen, Gleditsch, and Bjerkholt 1984). Because 
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defense spending is a government expenditure, each increment of defense 
spending brings either a heavier tax burden or a bigger government budget 
deficit or both (Chan 1987). Because a country’s capability to provide capital 
resources for future productive capacities depends on savings and investment, 
given the amount of savings, an increase in defense spending will reduce the 
available funds for planned investment. The second type of tradeoff occurs 
because the defense sector preempts a significant share of the capital stock and 
natural resources (Ram 1993). For example, the military sector owns a large 
portion of the capital equipment, structures, and inventories. A large portion of 
these capital goods could have been used for productive investment. 
Moreover, the military uses land and energy for military purposes, such as 
training, that could have been used in other ways. In addition, according to 
Chan (1985) “Military expenditures tend to be more import-demanding in 
developing countries than other forms of public spending and, thus, again 
contribute more to their unfavorable balance of payments”. In the long run, 
they will generate or exacerbate domestic inflation and/or problems in balance 
of payment, which will reduce the economy’s competitiveness in international 
trade. With respect to the theoretical treatment of the defense burden issue, 
Deger and Sen (1995) summarize the direct opportunity costs to economic 
activity from military resource use that has appeared in previous studies. This 
list includes lower levels of private sector investment and domestic savings, 
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diminished domestic consumption due to lower aggregate demand, and a 
smaller tax base available for providing needed civilian, public sector 
services—each of which is expected to directly and negatively influence 
economic growth. They also note various indirect costs that military resource 
use might have on growth. For example, the private sector business investment 
may be crowded out due to higher prevailing interest rates in the economy 
then the military sector is financed primarily through deficit spending. 
Domestic savings may further decline from the loss of public sector services or 
transfer payments that must compete with the military for tax revenues. The 
increased displacement of a well-educated workforce into military service also 
deprives the civilian sector of the use of labor and its human capital, further 
decreasing economic growth. Therefore, if one assumes that declining 
marginal productivity prevails in the civilian sector of a nation’s economy, 
then the magnitude of these direct and indirect opportunity costs to economic 
growth should increase at an increasing rate as the military sector uses a 
greater portion of a nation’s available productive resources.  
 
3.1.1.3 No Relation between Defense Spending and Growth 
Of course, there are arguments that there is no significant relationship between 
defense spending and economic growth (Biswas and Ram 1986, Alexander 
1990, Kinsella 1990, Payne and Ross 1992, Ward et al. 1992, DeRouen 1993). 
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According to Biswas and Ram (1986), “Defense spending may have either 
positive or negative effect on growth for a certain period of time in countries 
experiencing certain conditions (recession or expansion and growth, level of 
the socioeconomic development of the country concerned, etc.). However, it is 
neither consistent nor statistically significant.”  
 
3.2 Studies for Turkey 
In parallel with different findings in the world, the results of the studies on 
defense spending-economic growth relationship in Turkey are also not clear-
cut. Some of the studies are those by Sezgin (1997) and Özsoy (2000). Both 
employ a so-called Feder-Ram production function model (Feder 1983; Ram 
1986; Biswas and Ram 1986). In both studies, physical investment turns out to 
be statistically insignificant. Labor also turns up statistically insignificant in 
Özsoy's study, but positive and significant in Sezgin's paper. Human capital is 
statistically insignificant in both studies. Both studies find a positive and 
statistically significant overall effect of the Turkish military sector on Turkish 
economic growth. In addition, Sezgin finds a statistically significant and 
negative spillover effect from the military to the civilian sector and also 
computes a negative factor-productivity differential, which means that the 
military sector is less productive of economic growth than is the civilian sector 
in Turkey. Özsoy's findings are somewhat different. He finds human capital, 
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investment, and labor statistically insignificant, but non-military public sector, 
the military public sector, and the civilian sector make statistically significant 
positive contributions to economic growth. When the equation is changed to 
estimate spill-over effects, however, all variables turn out to be statistically 
insignificant except for the spill-over effect from the nonmilitary public sector 
to the civilian sector whose effect is estimated as positive. Sezgin (1997) 
computes rolling estimates over 24-year sub-periods from 1950-1973 through 
1970-1993 and finds that the overall and the spillover effects of the military 
sector in Turkey are large and statistically significant in the early time periods, 
but gradually decline and become statistically insignificant in the later time 
periods. This positive effect of defence spending on economic growth is 
supported by Sezgin’s further studies (1999b, 2000). However, Sezgin (1999a) 
found a negative relationship by using a Granger causality model. Sezgin’s 
study (2000) presents much stronger results in favor of the thesis that military 
expenditure in Turkey contributed positively to its economic growth. In this 
paper, investment and the quantity and quality of the labor force are 
statistically significantly and positively related to economic growth as well. 
The spill-over effect from the military to the civilian sector is still negative, as 
is the productivity differential meaning that the civilian sector is more 
productive of economic growth than is the military sector. But unlike Sezgin 
(1997), Özsoy (2000) computes a positive factor-productivity differential for 
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the military sector, which means that it is more productive than the nonmilitary 
public sector. Their contrasting findings are as follows: 
"...empirical evidence showed that Turkish defence spending is not detrimental 
for the Turkish economy; on the contrary, it helps economic growth" (Sezgin 
1997, 407). 
"Due to the positive effects of the nonmilitary and military sectors on Turkish 
economic growth, the results reported here suggest that the Turkish 
government should not make drastic resource-allocation changes between 
nonmilitary and military public spending" (Özsoy 2000, 156). 
In a large-scale macro econometric disarmament model Özmucur (1996) finds 
that any peace dividend "may prove substantial, if resources can be directed 
towards government non-military investment"; a conclusion in contrast with 
Sezgin (1997) and Özsoy (2000). He also finds substantial negative and 
statistically significant correlation coefficients between the budgetary shares of 
Turkish military expenditure and those expenditures on health and education 
for the data from 1924-1994. Also, Dunne et al (2001) and Sezgin (1999a) 
conducted a Granger causality analysis of defence spending and growth for 
Turkey and found significant negative effect of military spending on economic 
growth. More recently, Sezgin and Yıldırım (2002), by employing a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) over the period of 1949-1994, found that military 
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expenditure appears to enhance economic growth both in the short run and in 
the long run, supporting Sezgin’s previous findings (1997, 1999b, 2000). 
 
Overall, the findings are not conclusive, but mostly providing evidence that 
defence spending enhances economic growth. 
 
3.3 Models Used in Estimating Defense-Growth Relationship 
Since the specification of the model has important effects on the findings, a 
model should specify relationships between the defense sector and the rest of 
the economy (Adams and Park 1995, Sandler and Hartley 1995).  To reflect 
this relationship, scholars generally used three types of approaches in defense 
economics. 
 
3.3.1 Supply Side (Feder Type) Studies 
One of the most commonly used approaches to the study of the defense-
growth relationship is the neoclassical production function approach, which 
employs a supply-side description of changes in aggregate output. Feder 
(1983) developed a model, which divides the economy into two sectors 
(export and non-export) to analyze the impact of the export sector on 
economic growth. Ram (1986), and Biswas and Ram (1986) firstly applied this 
model to the study of defense spending and economic growth. Since then, 
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many scholars have applied the Feder Model for defense-growth relationship 
(See Atesoglu and Mueller 1990, Alexander 1990, Biswas and Ram 1986, 
Biswas 1993, Mintz and Stevenson 1995, Adams, Behrman and Boldin 1991, 
Macnair et al. 1995, Mintz and Huang 1990, 1991, Ram 1986, Ward and 
Davis 1992). In this model, it is assumed that the economy consists of two 
sectors namely, a civilian sector (C) and a defense sector (M). There are 
externalities from defense sector to civilian sector. According to Sandler and 
Hartley (1995), this approach has much to offer, because it is developed from 
a consistent theoretical structure and it considers externalities between sectors 
and may explain both the size effect of defense expenditures and factor 
productivity differentials. At the same time, the models relatively need less 
data, which are generally a major problem for many developing countries. The 
theory behind this approach is as follows: It is generally assumed that real 
output per capita and capital stock grow at more or less constant rates over 
certain time periods even though there may be short-term fluctuations. It can 
also be assumed that a steady increase of labor and capital input will also 
increase aggregate output at a steady rate (Solow 1970). Thus, the growth of 
aggregate output can be explained by changes in capital and labor. According 
to Hall and Taylor (1988, 369), “Productivity also contributes to economic 
growth and grows at a steady rate over the long run”. For this reason, the 
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standard production function approach explains economic growth with 
changes in capital, labor, and productivity. 
According to Solow (1957), however, technology tells us how much economic 
output can be produced from the amount of labor and capital used in 
production. In another study, Solow (1970, 35) writes that “The labor 
augmenting from technological progress is necessary for steady-state growth 
to be possible.” Denison (1985) also contends that advances in technology 
provide a way to produce at lower cost. In addition, as Chan (1985) pointed 
out, the defense-growth relationship is not likely to be linear. Including 
technological progress with the rate of eλt, the relationship between defense 
spending and economic growth in the nonlinear context can be actually 
investigated. Thus, it is important to include technological progress in the 
defense-growth model to accurately estimate the relationship between the two 
variables. 
Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) include technological progress in their study of 
the economic effects of defense spending on growth in the context of a two- 
sector (military and nonmilitary) production function model. However, 
assuming two sectors in the economic outputs is problematic because the 
nonmilitary sector involves both the nonmilitary government sector and the 
private sector, which implicitly assumes that they have identical rates of 
productivity and technological progress. However, it is generally believed that 
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productivity and technological progress rates in the government sector are 
different from those in the private sector.  Ward and Davis (1992) showed that 
the government sector has lower productivity than the civilian sector. 
Therefore, it is theoretically more reasonable to separate the military sector 
and the nonmilitary government sector. 
Most of supply-side studies showed that defense spending has no significant 
impact on economic growth or a small positive effect. These findings are 
consistent despite the different sample size, different time periods and different 
estimating procedures.  
 
3.3.2 Demand and Supply Side (Deger Type) Studies 
Defense spending may have growth promoting effects through supply factors 
(such as technology spin-off, positive externalities from an infrastructure, 
human capital, etc.). Also, defense spending may affect economic growth 
through demand side factors (such as crowding out of investment, exports, 
health spending, etc.). Therefore, both demand and supply side factors should 
be considered in a defense-growth relationship analysis. In defense-growth 
literature, a few studies comprised demand and supply factors of economic 
growth. They all estimate very similar multi-equation models and 
hypothesized possible positive direct effect of defense spending on growth 
through Kesnesian demand stimulation and other spin-off effects, and negative 
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indirect effect through reducing savings or investment. That is, in majority of 
the studies using demand and supply-side models, the net effect of defense 
expenditures on growth is negative (Balfoussias and Stawrinos 1995, Deger 
1986, Deger and Smith 1983, Dortmans et. al. 1995, Lebovic and Ishaq 1987, 
Scheetz 1991). 
 
3.3.3 Granger Causality Tests 
Some of the studies applied Granger causality tests (Chowdhury 1991, 
Jeording 1986 and Madden and Haslehurst 1995). Jeording’s findings (1986) 
indicated that causality runs from growth to defense and defense spending is a 
dependent variable on growth. These results were very surprising, because the 
studies assumed defense spending is independent variable. On the other hand, 
for over half of the sample no causality was found by Madden and Haslehurst 
(1995). 
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C h a p t e r  4  
METHODOLOGY 
In this study, the methodology is based on Engle-Granger (1987) 
Cointegration Analysis by employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation. Before Engle-Granger two-step procedure, the variables are tested 
for stationarity and order of integration using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) Unit Root Test (Dickey and Fuller 1981). 
  
4.1 Unit Root Tests 
Most economic series are non-stationary, i.e. increasing over time. This has 
been regarded as a problem in econometric analysis, as any analysis using 
non-stationary variables leads to the spurious regression problem. That is, if 
the series are not stationary, one can obtain a model with promising, but false, 
diagnostic tests. One solution to this problem is to difference the series 
successively until stationarity is achieved. A time series is stationary if its 
basic statistical properties remain constant over time. The simplest and most 
widely used test is ADF unit root test. In this study, the stationarity of the time 
series is obtained by employing ADF unit root tests at levels and the first 
differences. 
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4.1.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test is based on simple regressions. 
Usually, three ADF tests are conducted to following regressions: The first 
regression includes both constant and trend, the second one includes only 
constant, the third one includes neither constant, nor trend. 
In this study, the regression includes both constant and trend1. The lag lengths 
are chosen according to Akaike Criterion. 
                                                    n 
∆yt= c + T + αyt-1 + Σßi∆yt-i 
                                   i=1 
where  
∆yt : Change in y 
c    : Constant 
T   : Trend 
α   : Coefficient 
ß   : Coefficient 
t    : Year (1950-2001) 
This specification is used to test the following hypothesis: 
H0 : α = 0 (null hypothesis that the series is integrated of order one, i.e. non-
stationary) 
                                                 
1  Time trend is used to pick up the effects of other determinants of economic growth that are missing in the 
model. 
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H1 : α < 0 (alternative hypothesis that the  series is integrated of order zero, i.e. 
stationary) 
If α is significantly smaller than zero, then the null hypothesis that the series 
contain unit root is rejected and alternative hypothesis, which means that the yt 
is stationary, is accepted.2  
4.2 Cointegration Analysis 
The finding that many macro time series may contain a unit root has spurred 
the development of the theory of non-stationary time series analysis. Engle and 
Granger (1987) pointed out that a linear combination of two or more non-
stationary series may be stationary. The stationary linear combination is called 
the cointegrating equation and may be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the variables. They showed that any cointegrated series 
have an error correction representation, which incorporates both the economic 
theory to the long run relationship between the variables and short run 
disequilibrium behavior. They proposed a two-step procedure where the first 
step is to estimate the long run function using the levels of the stationary 
series. In the second step, the lagged residuals from this regression are used as 
error correction term in a dynamic error correction mechanism formulation, 
which captures the short run dynamics. 
                                                 
2 For the test statistics, recently, MacKinnon (1991) has implemented a much larger set of simulations than 
those tabulated by Dickey and Fuller. So, Mackinnon critical values were used for rejection of the null 
hypothesis. 
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After testing for stationarity, the possible existence of a long-run relationship 
between the non-stationary variables, which are integrated of I (1)3, is tested 
by using the two-step Engle-Granger cointegration analysis. To make an 
Engle-Granger cointegration analysis among series, they must be integrated of 
the same order. For example, series must be all I (0), I (1) or I (2), etc.). If the 
series are integrated of different orders, then it can be concluded that two 
variables are not cointegrated.  
 
In the model, a time trend is also used in the long run estimation. From an 
economic point of view, the time trend may pick up the effects of other 
determinants of economic growth that are missing in the model. Additionally, 
four dummy variables are included in the model. D76, which takes the value 
of one for 1976, is employed to capture the effects of increased military 
spending after the Cyprus conflict. D88 takes the value of one for 1988 and 
intended to reflect the possible effects of the changes in the economic policy in 
1988; D94 and D99 take the value of one for 1994 and 1999 successively and 
aimed to capture the effects of the economic crises in those years. 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
3 A difference stationary series is said to be integrated and is denoted as I (d) where d is order of 
integration. The order of integration is the number of unit roots contained in the series, or the number of 
differencing operations it takes to make the series stationary. If there is one unit root, it is an I (1) series. If there is 
two unit roots, it is an I (2) series. Similarly, a stationary series is I (0). 
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4.2.1 Cointegration Model for Turkey 
The first step in Engle and Granger cointegration analysis is to estimate the 
long-run relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables by regressing the variables at levels using OLS. In this way, the 
regression residuals also can be obtained. The OLS regression is as follows: 
 
Yt= c + T + α0Mt + α1St + α2Lt + α3Bt + α4D + εt                                  (1) 
where 
Y     : Dependent variable (GDP in million TL) 
M    : Military expenditures (in million TL) 
S     : Savings or Capital Formation (in million TL) 
L     : Labor force (in million) 
B     : Balance of trade (Imports-Exports, in million TL) 
ε    : Error term 
The four dummy variables, D used in the equation are as follows: 
D76 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1976, zero otherwise. 
D88 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1988, zero otherwise. 
D94 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1994, zero otherwise. 
D99 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1999, zero otherwise. 
T      : Trend 
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c      : Constant 
t       : Year (1950-2001) 
After estimating the model, an important question is whether the variables are 
cointegrated or whether the regression is spurious. So, to test the existence of 
unit roots (that is, no cointegration) in the OLS residuals, the residuals of 
equation (1) are obtained, and denoted as RES. Then, a unit root analysis was 
performed for RES. If the residuals from the cointegrating regression are 
stationary, I(0), then the variables are said to be cointegrated. To test for a unit 
root in the OLS residuals; ADF unit root test is employed with a trend and a 
constant by using the following regression equation. 
                                                                     n 
∆RESt= c + T + αRESt-1 + Σßi∆RESt-i 
                                                     i=1 
where  
RESt : Residual (Random error on day t) 
c       : Constant 
T       : Trend 
α       : Coefficient  
ß       : Coefficient 
t        : Year (1950-2001) 
This specification is used to test the following hypothesis: 
H0 : α = 0 (null hypothesis that the OLS residuals contain unit root, i.e. non-
stationary) 
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H1 : α < 0 (alternative hypothesis that the OLS residuals do not contain unit 
root, i.e. stationary) 
If α is significantly smaller than zero, then the null hypothesis that the OLS 
residuals contain unit root is rejected. This means that the OLS residuals are 
stationary. Thus, the variables in the model are said to be cointegrated since 
their linear combination is stationary (α < 0) even though each variable is non-
stationary. If the null hypothesis were failed to rejected, then there would be 
no cointegration between the series and this means that the series have no 
long-run relationship.  
 
4.2.2 Error Correction Model for Turkey 
If the residuals from equation (1) are stationary, the following short run 
equation will be estimated in the second stage of the Engle-Granger 
methodology: 
 
∆Yt= c + α0∆Mt + α1∆St + α2∆Lt + α3∆Bt + α4D + ∆RESt-1                 (2)      
where 
Y     : Dependent variable (GDP in million TL) 
c      : Constant 
M    : Military expenditures (in million TL) 
S      : Savings (in million TL) 
  38 
L      : Labor force (in million) 
B      : Balance of trade (in million TL) 
RES : Residuals from cointegrating regression 
The four dummy variables, D used in the equation are as follows: 
D76 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1976, zero otherwise. 
D88 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1988, zero otherwise. 
D94 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1994, zero otherwise. 
D99 : Dummy variable which takes the value of one in 1999, zero otherwise. 
t       : Year (1950-2001). 
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C h a p t e r  5  
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
5.1 Data Sources 
When using military data, there are always problems of reliability and quality. 
Difficulty of finding the past data back to 1950s in Turkey is another problem. 
In this study, data on defense spending was taken from SIPRI, since it is 
considered the most reliable source. Data for GDP, savings, balance of trade, 
and labor force were taken from the State Institute of Statistics. All figures 
(except labour force) were deflated in constant 1987 prices.   
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
Before the estimation of equation (1) and (2), ADF unit root tests are 
conducted. The results of the ADF test indicate that all of the variables have 
unit roots in levels. However, after first differencing (which is used to assess 
the robustness of the results in a dynamic structure), the variables qualify as I 
(1), i.e. stationary. Table 3 presents the test results. 
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Table 3: Unit Root Test Results in Levels and First Differences 
Note: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1% level, respectively. The reported values are obtained from 
Eviews version 4.0. 
 
After the unit root tests, the estimation is performed by employing Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) Regression for the time period of 1950-2001, using PC 
Give version 8.0 (See Doornik and Hendry 1995). The cointegration analysis 
between economic growth and military expenditures is tested following the 
procedure outlined in Engle-Granger (1987). Table 4 shows the results.  
 
Table 4: The Engle-Granger First Stage (Long-Run) Estimation Results 
for Growth Equation (1950-2001) 
Dep. Var. Constant M S B L Trend 
Y -12.107*** 8.0887*** 1.6867*** 0.040147 1.4626*** 0.33957*** 
t-statistics -2.413 9.056 13.128 0.185 2.928 4.073 
R2  = 0.9977 F(5,42)  = 3697.4 [0.0000] ∆RES ADF Test = -6.151*** 
Note: *= 10%, **=5%, ***= 1% level, respectively. The reported values are obtained from PC 
Give version 8.0. 
Variables Unit Root in Levels  I (0) 
Unit Root in First Differences  
I  (1)  
Y -1.238942 -4.546946*** 
M -1.737026 -7.164809*** 
S -2.467535 -6.674996*** 
L -1.273930 -7.134324*** 
B -0.085060 -5.633068*** 
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The long run economic growth is positively related to all variables in the 
specification. It is empirically significant that military spending positively 
affects economic growth. In addition, savings and labor force are positively 
related to economic growth, which is in accordance with the growth literature. 
Despite its positive sign, balance of trade does not have a significant effect. 
According to ADF test to the residuals of the model, it is also found that 
cointegration does exist (Table 4). The result indicates that the residuals from 
the cointegrating regression are stationary and the variables are said to be 
cointegrated.  
 
After completing the first stage successfully, the short-run dynamics of 
economic growth is estimated. The results are presented in Table 5. In this 
estimation, savings, labor and defense spending are positively, where balance 
of trade is negatively related with economic growth. All the variables are 
significant at 1 % level. Furthermore, the short run estimation has an 
adjustment coefficient of -0.58 (RESt-1), which indicates that 58 percent of 
disequilibrium is corrected each year.  The coefficient of R2 (0.78) shows the 
success of the regression in predicting the change in GDP. The Durbin-Watson 
(DW) statistic is also presented to analyse the presence of serial correlation in 
the residuals of the model. As a rule of thumb, if the DW is less than two, 
there is evidence of positive serial correlation. Since it is 2.0829 in our 
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estimation, we can conclude that there is no evidence of positive serial 
correlation in the analysis. 
 
Table 5: The Engle-Granger Second Stage (Short-Run) Estimation 
Results for Growth Equation (1950-2001) 
Dependent Variable ∆Y 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant 0.8289*** 2.373 
∆M 5.8648*** 4.470 
∆S 1.0404*** 6.075 
∆B -0.5460*** -4.295 
∆L 2.6132** 2.282 
RESt-1 -0.5862*** -3.381 
Summary Statistics Diagnostics 
R2 0.7829 AR 1- 2 F( 2, 39) 2.2924 
DW 2.0829 ARCH 1 F(1, 39) 2.289 
SE 2299881 NORM chi2(2) 3.5805 
F(5,41) 
29.583 
[0.0000] 
Xi2 F (10, 30) 
 
1.8286 
[0.098] 
Note: *= 10%, **=5%, ***= 1% level, respectively. The reported values are obtained from PC 
Give version 8.0. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
CONCLUSIONS 
The unique contribution of this thesis is that it provided empirical evidence to 
the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth in Turkey 
by using a simple cointegration analysis.  
 
Ultimately, the analysis revealed that military spending had a positive and 
significant influence on economic growth both in the long run and in the short 
run during the period of 1950-2001. Despite the arguments against the 
allocation of more resources to military expenditures in Turkey and these 
expenditures being unproductive to economic growth, we found a 
contradicting result. Defense spending followed an increasing trend over the 
last fifty years but it did not have detrimental impact on Turkey's economic 
growth. Instead, it is found that these expenditures enhanced her economic 
growth during the period analyzed. 
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APPENDIX A: Military Spending in Europe, Middle East and the World 
(Figures are in US $b., at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages) 
 
SOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGION 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
CHANGE 
(%) 1992-
2001 
Europe 
296 278 275 239 235 238 227 233 241 242 - 18 
Central and 
Eastern 95.4 84.6 86.5 60.4 55.4 59.0 47.3 51.6 57.4 60.5 - 37 
Western 
201 194 189 179 180 179 179 182 183 181 - 10 
Africa 
9.3 8.8 9.3 8.9 8.5 8.8 9.3 10.9 11.3 12.2 +32 
South Asia 
11.3 12.3 12.3 12.9 13.1 13.7 13.8 15.1 16.4 17.4 +54 
Middle 
East 52.3 51.0 50.9 47.9 48.9 53.5 57.8 56.1 63.1 72.4 + 38 
World 
847 814 793 741 722 732 719 728 757 772 - 9 
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APPENDIX B: Major Spenders 
(Figures are in US$ b., at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates.) 
[ ]: Estimated 
SOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook 2002. 
 
 
 
 
Country Rank in 2001 
Rank in 
2000 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Share (%)  
of World 
Mil.Exp. 
USA 1 1 274.3 275.1 285.7 281.4 36 
[Russia] 2 2 30.6 35.9 40.3 43.9 6 
France 3 3 40.0 40.4 39.9 40.0 5 
Japan 4 4 37.7 37.8 38.1 38.5 5 
UK 5 5 37.2 36.8 37.3 37.0 5 
Sub-total top 5                                                                                  440.8 57 
Germany 6 6 33.1 33.8 33.1 32.4 4 
[China] 7 8 19.0 21.1 23.1 27.0 3 
Saudi 
Arabia 8 9 20.8 17.9 20.5 26.6 3 
Italy 9 7 23.5 24.4 26.0 24.7 3 
Brazil 10 10 11.0 10.1 10.7 14.1 2 
Sub-total top 10                                                                                 575.6 73 
India 11 11 9.4 10.7 11.8 12.9 2 
South Korea 12 13 9.7 9.4 10.0 10.2 1 
Israel 13 14 8.5 8.5 9.0 9.1 1 
Turkey 14 12 8.8 9.7 9.4 8.9 1 
Spain 15 15 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.0 1 
Sub-total top 15                              614.7 80 
World total                                             719             728               757                772         100.0 
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APPENDIX C: Data Set  
(Figures are in million TL, at constant 1987 prices) 
Year Y (m TL) S  (m TL) B  (m TL) M  (m TL) L  (m) 
1950 10.826.902,73 1.310.055,23 -98.904,49 459.254,16 10,05 
1951 12.204.872,17 1.659.862,62 -53.294,59 469.568,53 10,31 
1952 13.667.207,09 2.063.748,27 -168.925,39 508.178,04 10,60 
1953 15.213.907,48 2.525.508,64 -333.812,01 553.231,53 10,90 
1954 14.763.958,27 2.657.512,49 -262.247,59 595.785,78 11,21 
1955 15.916.953,11 2.880.968,51 -259.069,25 615.932,85 11,63 
1956 16.423.145,97 2.890.473,69 -294.137,46 592.878,81 11,81 
1957 17.716.749,93 3.029.564,24 -147.275,46 525.213,32 12,20 
1958 18.504.161,04 3.071.690,73 -94.050,72 533.801,38 12,55 
1959 19.269.412,15 3.102.375,36 -101.460,63 652.073,83 12,91 
1960 19.929.543,87 3.188.727,02 -426.523,60 706.475,52 12,42 
1961 20.328.030,14 2.845.924,22 -400.539,92 765.588,97 12,53 
1962 21.584.710,14 2.762.842,90 -420.852,15 766.588,88 12,65 
1963 23.675.258,51 3.574.964,04 -575.317,76 767.982,31 12,77 
1964 24.640.174,58 4.139.549,33 -711.483,80 816.546,24 12,89 
1965 25.413.102,95 4.498.119,22 -454.685,29 868.676,25 12,36 
1966 28.460.496,43 5.350.573,33 -213.684,72 853.884,15 12,51 
1967 29.657.417,55 5.961.140,93 -341.009,67 921.929,68 12,53 
1968 31.635.197,40 6.675.026,65 -168.895,87 995.810,05 12,59 
1969 33.002.579,14 7.293.569,99 -397.241,59 971.054,99 12,62 
1970 34.468.624,10 7.617.565,93 -338.358,88 1.034.482,52 12,58 
1971 36.897.376,98 7.674.654,41 -618.601,20 1.199.467,30 12,84 
1972 40.279.247,86 8.619.759,04 -932.165,61 1.277.207,93 13,14 
1973 42.255.004,28 9.084.825,92 -931.733,13 1.290.873,90 13,91 
1974 43.633.171,65 8.552.101,64 -714.130,41 1.284.704,38 14,21 
1975 46.275.413,52 9.069.981,05 -1.875.394,58 2.022.747,01 14,39 
1976 50.437.967,69 11.348.542,73 -2.440.361,79 2.364.303,85 14,59 
1977 51.944.339,30 10.596.645,22 -2.160.694,09 2.333.643,36 15,07 
1978 52.582.170,89 8.938.969,05 -2.268.168,66 2.116.073,57 15,28 
1979 52.324.175,68 8.214.895,58 -909.503,88 1.696.552,16 15,51 
1980 50.869.915,21 8.139.186,43 -853.745,75 1.780.932,82 15,70 
1981 53.316.849,31 9.756.983,42 -2.199.730,45 2.080.552,91 15,84 
1982 54.963.215,73 9.398.709,89 -1.693.668,48 2.319.289,94 16,01 
1983 57.279.000,09 9.451.035,01 -1.072.978,57 2.288.766,06 16,17 
1984 61.349.829,93 10.122.721,94 -1.976.014,64 2.222.446,36 16,42 
1985 63.989.098,66 12.093.939,65 -1.220.035,76 2.235.525,46 16,70 
1986 68.314.878,16 14.960.958,32 -1.014.350,91 2.493.167,77 17,01 
1987 75.019.388,10 17.929.633,76 -1.061.000,00 2.477.000,00 17,40 
1988 76.108.142,60 20.701.414,79 -682.277,21 2.232.425,17 17,67 
1989 77.347.305,10 17.093.754,43 478.111,70 2.403.317,11 18,01 
1990 84.591.716,93 18.610.177,72 -763.966,87 2.953.210,11 18,36 
1991 84.887.074,38 18.165.833,92 -2.251.861,12 3.165.504,70 18,42 
1992 90.322.516,48 19.509.663,56 -1.440.767,04 3.463.602,66 18,60 
1993 97.676.585,70 22.172.584,95 -1.578.857,90 3.800.653,54 18,70 
1994 91.733.009,80 21.190.325,26 -2.651.121,87 3.459.845,93 19,17 
1995 99.028.241,30 21.885.241,33 -3.108.501,37 3.862.101,41 19,31 
1996 106.079.781,00 21.003.796,64 -3.230.805,98 4.349.271,02 19,55 
1997 114.874.197,00 24.583.078,16 -2.353.349,40 4.709.842,08 19,78 
1998 119.303.117,00 27.081.807,56 -3.695.851,32 5.130.034,03 20,02 
1999 112.043.830,00 23.753.291,96 -4.429.923,43 5.602.191,50 20,25 
2000 119.144.472,00 21.565.149,43 -14.072.905,50 5.838.079,13 20,49 
2001 107.783.063,00 16.921.940,89 -5.495.855,63 5.496.936,21 20,72 
